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Zoltan BARTHA1 
MID-TERM EFFECTS OF THE FLAT RATE PERSONAL 
INCOME TAX IN HUNGARY 
The objective of the paper is to examine whether the advantages and disadvantages 
mentioned in the literature of the flat rate income tax could be observed in Hungary. 
Personal income tax data provided by the Hungarian National Tax and Customs 
Administration was used to check the arguments. It was found that the flat tax indeed 
favours richer taxpayers, and because of the family tax credits, it heavily favours families 
with children. Tax revenues declined as tax rates were cut, while the GDP growth rate was 
close to stagnant. Both of these developments go against the expectations of the flat tax 
supporters, although it has to be mentioned that the changes were made in the midst of a 
European- and world-wide depression, which could have distorted the pure effects of the 
new tax code. Although in many countries the flat rate tax was a positive signal for investors 
boosting foreign direct investments, the Hungarian government introduced extra taxes on 
some of the transnational companies in order to balance the budget (and compensate for the 
lost personal income tax revenues), which meant that there was a decline in the mood of the 
investors. There is some indication that some illegal activities are shifted to the legal 
domain: the ratio of those tax reporters who earned an annual income of HUF 2 million or 
higher has gone from 62.5% to 66.6% in the period of 2010-12.  
Keywords: flat rate income tax, Hungary, tax statistics, income distribution 
1. INTRODUCTION
Introducing a flat rate income tax has become a trend in the transition economies of 
Eastern and Central Europe. Estonia and Lithuania has had it since 1994; Latvia opted for 
it in 1995, Russia in 2001, Serbia in 2003, Slovakia and Ukraine in 2004, Georgia and 
Romania in 2005, Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania in 2007, the Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria in 2008, Belarus and Bosnia in 2009 and Hungary in 2011. Economists 
traditionally have attributed some advantages and disadvantages to such tax systems, but 
these theories were hard to test, because for a long time there were very few countries 
using flat rate income taxes (the rare exceptions included Hong Kong and Jamaica). But 
as the number of countries converting to the new tax code increased, more and more 
empirical evidence could be gathered. 
Yet, the assessment of the flat rate income tax system is still very difficult, for several 
reasons. One of the major problems is that flat taxes affect people belonging to high and 
low income groups very differently, and therefore aggregated data that are usually 
provided by the tax authorities do not allow for sophisticated analysis. The midterm 
macroeconomic effects of the tax code change may be measured over 2 years, the longer 
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term ones over 5 years according to Erdős2, which means that a country needs to sustain 
the system for at least 6-8 years in order to get some empirical data on the changes in the 
behaviour of taxpayers. In reality there were no countries that kept the same tax code for 
longer than a decade. Minor changes were introduced every year (about tax exemptions, 
or rate changes), and the possible return to the old system, or a possible change for 
something new was discussed regularly – something that surely affected the expectations 
of taxpayers. Also, the flat rate income tax system introduced usually was very different 
from the textbook version (e.g. several deductions and exemptions were allowed, which 
goes completely against the idea of having one single rate – see Table 1 for details). 
Finally, personal income is subject to social security contribution as well (a sort of payroll 
tax), and assessing the effects of income tax changes without including the social security 
contribution can lead to misleading results. 
This paper is made up of three main parts. It offers a general literature review on the 
possible micro- and macroeconomic effects, advantages and disadvantages of the flat rate 
personal income tax. The review section is followed by the empirical assessment of the 
Hungarian experience, and the paper is concluded with the most important Hungarian 
findings. 
2. FLAT RATE INCOME TAX 
In the textbook version, a flat rate income tax describes a situation where the income is 
taxed at the same rate irrespective of the income of the taxpayer. This means that if the 
flat (or single) rate is 16% – as in case of Hungary – a taxpayer with an annual income of 
1,000 euros pays a total of 160 as income tax, while one with an income of 1,000,000 
pays 160,000. A key point of the original suggestion made by Hall and Rabushka3 was 
that all income, including business and corporate income should be taxed at the same rate. 
Most tax codes however, do not follow this logic, so this paper only discusses personal 
income taxes.  
The traditional alternatives of the flat rate (or single rate or linear) personal income tax 
are progressive and lump-sum taxes. Lump-sum taxes theoretically are great, because they 
do not alter economic behaviour, but are impossible to use. It is clear that people differ in 
their ability to earn an income, therefore the lump-sum tax would mean an unbearably 
high burden for some, and a pitiful sum for others. If, however, the lump-sum tax was 
adjusted to the abilities of the lowest income taxpayers, tax revenues would be very low. 
Because of these problems taxation is usually connected to the income of the individual. 
The other alternative to flat taxes is the progressive tax system. Mirrlees4 showed that 
if taxpayers have different utility functions and different productivities (a quite realistic 
assumption) progressive taxes are a better alternative to linear ones, because they can lead 
to higher revenues. In other words a flat rate tax code would lead to lower burdens to 
more productive taxpayers. So why did so many Eastern and Central European countries 
opt for the flat rate system then? The explanations fall into two major categories: 
administrative-political arguments, and economic reasons. 
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Table 1. Flat rate personal income tax (PIT) characteristics in Eastern and Central Europe 
(Source: own compilation based on EY: http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax 
and KPMG: 
http://www.kpmg.com/GLOBAL/EN/SERVICES/TAX/Pages/default.aspx data) 
Country Flat rate 
introduction 
year 
Original 
rate (%) 
2014 
rate (%) 
Remarks 
Albania 2007 10 13-23 abandoned the flat rate system in 
2014 
Belarus 2009 12 12 several deductions 
Bosnia 2009 10 10 low income exemption and child 
deduction 
Bulgaria 2008 10 10 deductions for mortgage and 
social security contribution 
Czech 
Republic 
2008 15 15-22 abandoned the flat rate system in 
2013 (several tax reliefs, and 
solidarity surtax) 
Estonia 1994 26 21 l low income exemption and 
child deduction 
Georgia 2005 12 20 non-taxable deductions 
depending on income level 
Hungary 2011 16 16 child deductions 
Latvia 1995 25 24 non-taxable income, and several 
deductions 
Lithuania 1994 33 15 low income exemption and child 
deduction 
Macedonia 2007 10 10 deductions for social security 
contribution 
Montenegro 2007 15 9 surtax in municipalities 
Romania 2005 16 16 non-taxable deductions 
depending on income level 
Russia 2001 13 13 several deductions 
Serbia 2003 14 15 partially abandoned the flat rate 
system in 2010 
Slovakia 2004 19 19-25 abandoned the flat rate system in 
2013 
Ukraine 2004 13 15 partially abandoned the flat rate 
system in 2007 
2.1. Political and administrative arguments 
One of the arguments for the flat tax is that it is a lot easier to administer, meaning that 
the transaction cost of paying and collecting the tax can be significantly lowered. It is not 
uncommon that an individual draws income from more than one activity. Apart from 
earning a salary for the first job, one can have a second job as well, offer professional 
services as a private entrepreneur, earn returns on capital investments etc. In a traditional 
tax system these activities are taxed either separately, often with a different tax rate, or 
28 Z. Bartha 
 
some of the income earned has to be accumulated, which poses further problems. In case 
of a flat tax the salary earned for the second job is taxed at the same rate as the first salary, 
so it is very easy to calculate the tax sum. With progressive rates however, it is quite 
likely that a second wage will bring the employee to a higher tax bracket (where income is 
taxed at a higher rate). In such a case the tax payable can only be determined if an 
estimate is made on the annual income, which is not that easy in the first place, and 
usually requires the employee to file complicated tax reports. 
The suggestion of Hall and Rabushka5 was not simply about taxing all kinds of income 
with the same rate, but also about the elimination of exemptions and deductions. The 
elimination of exemptions and deductions can of course hurt vested interests, but it can 
also lower transaction costs a great deal. Basham and Mitchell6 mention the differences in 
the length of tax codes as an example (pp. 111-112): the US federal income tax generate 
66,000 pages of regulation, while Hong Kong’s entire tax code (the jurisdiction that has 
had the flat tax system since 1947) is only 200 pages long,  
Longer and complicated tax codes have their own advantages, from a political point of 
view. Winer and Hettich7 point out that politicians tend to worry about the political cost 
per a dollar of revenue raised (basically, the political cost of the tax system) rather than 
the efficiency cost (measured as the deadweight loss of, and the transaction cost caused by 
taxes, the economic cost of the tax system). The political system therefore has the 
tendency to create high tax rates and more and more exemptions and deductions. The high 
rates are needed to produce the necessary revenues, and also make it look as if the rich 
pay more. Exemptions and deductions (even though they increase the transaction cost of 
taxing, and possibly even the deadweight loss, if other taxes have to be used to cover the 
holes in the budget) decrease the political cost of taxes. If deductions are possible after 
children and other dependants, health care and pension fund payments, tuition fees paid 
for the education of the children, long term savings, real estate and house purchases, 
charity donations etc., the political costs of the tax system may be lower, and politicians 
may be re-elected. The interesting point is that a large amount of deductions and 
exemptions move the tax system close to the flat rate (except for the poorest, who are 
usually exempted from tax payments in progressive systems, or even negative taxes may 
be in effect; and the richest, who will have to pay a lot of taxes even if they make use of 
all the exemptions and deductions). The major difference is in the transaction costs, which 
are considerably lower with a pure flat system. 
Unfortunately the transaction cost advantage coming from the cancellation of 
exemptions and deductions could not be realised in Eastern and Central Europe. There is 
virtually no country where the flat tax was introduced in its pure form. As a matter of fact, 
most countries have two, and not one single tax rate, because if someone does not reach a 
certain minimum income, he is exempted from personal income tax payment (this is the 
case in the Baltic states, Romania etc. – see Table 1.). On the other hand, even in countries 
where the flat rate applies even to the lowest of incomes (Hungary, some countries in the 
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Balkans), some kind of deduction is made possible, typically after children and long term 
savings. 
The fact that many “flat rate” countries have a zero rate for the taxpayers with the 
lowest income, comes from the realisation that the new system hits the poor the hardest. 
More than that, Hettich and Winer8 suggest, that the flat rate is tough even on the middle 
class, which is the reason why they think that a flat rate tax cannot last in a democratic 
system. This suggestion may be backed by the fact that there were several countries that 
have abolished the flat tax recently: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Albania among 
others. The Hettich-Winer9 argument can also explain why basically all countries have 
deductions built in their tax codes even after the introduction of the flat rate. 
Finally, governments can introduce a flat rate system as an indication of their 
commitment to market liberalisation, and market forces in general10. Investors may be 
concerned about the dedication of the government to the market economy and the rule of 
law, and they may fear a predatory turn in taxation. For the concerned investors a flat rate 
system may be a positive, reassuring signal. In Eastern and Central Europe, where the 
market economy is still not that well rooted as it is in the West, such signals can be 
important.  
If the signal hypothesis is true, there should be a strong correlation between the level 
of inward foreign direct investments (FDI) and tax systems in the Eastern and Central 
European region. Such connection however is hard to establish. The countries opted for 
the flat tax system in different years; FDI is determined by quite a few factors, such as 
global investment trends, geographic location of a country, other changes in government 
regulation etc. 
Fig. 1. shows the case of three countries. The three countries were chosen because 
Estonia, Russia and Slovakia are most often used as an example in the literature 
addressing flat rate tax issues in Central and Eastern Europe. As the cultural and 
institutional background, as well as the size of these countries is different, their experience 
can illustrate the effects of the flat rate tax across a wide range of cisrcumstances. Russia 
is the one whose example backs the signal hypothesis the most. Because they switched to 
the new system in 2001, the data are shown from 1999 to 2006. It is clear to see that by 
2003 the inward FDI almost quadrupled, and by 2006 it was fourteen times higher 
compared to 2001. But the period coincided with a lot of favourable events: Russia’s 
institutions stabilised (the flat rate tax is part of that), a boom cycle started in investments, 
the price of commodities soared which lead to huge investments in the sector, and all 
these events expanded the size of the Russian consumer market by a great deal. 
Estonia’s case (1992-1999) is less convincing. Although the inward FDI was lower 
before the flat tax (1994), and it more than doubled by 1998, the trend is very hectic. 
Slovakia’s example is even more confusing, and it does not seem to support the signal 
hypothesis at all. It has to be said that the end of the period in Slovakia’s case is 2009, the 
year in which there was a huge drop in FDI globally. 
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Fig 1. Inward foreign direct investments in Estonia, Russia and Slovakia, year of flat tax 
introduced=0, FDI in period 0=1 (100%), (Source: own compilation based on 
UNCTAD data: http://unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx) 
 
2.2. Economic explanations 
Income taxes clearly have an effect on the two most important dimensions of the 
economy: growth and income distribution. The direction of the effect is not clear, though. 
Usually higher taxes slow down economic growth, and they have the potential to make 
income distribution more equal. But the redistribution process can be captured, meaning 
that higher taxes do not necessarily narrow income differences; and higher taxes can still 
generate growth in the Keynesian model. The different schools of economics could not 
agree on which of the two is more important, either. Kuznets11 argued that higher income 
differences were key in the generation of savings, which then could be used to finance 
higher investments, which on the other hand lead to robust economic growth. The quick 
growth rate and high per capita income can then be used to narrow the gap between the 
rich and the poor. Piketty12 on the other hand showed that wealth accumulates faster than 
the rate of economic growth, which meant in his interpretation that income differences 
will become larger and larger if no major steps are taken to close them down. 
Although it is not quite the same division, but the growth vs. income distribution 
debate can also be imagined as a supply side vs. demand side approach to the economy. 
This paper discusses the possible effects of the flat tax from this perspective. First, the 
demand side arguments will be discussed, and the supply side will come second. 
The demand side argument is generally based on the multiplier-accelerator effect 
common in Keynesian-based models. In order to have any change in the macroeconomic 
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demand, the flat tax needs to change the tax burden and/or the income distribution. 
Usually the flat rate personal income tax changes both: it decreases the overall personal 
income tax revenue, and leaves more money in the pocket of the rich (more on this will 
follow in the supply side discussion). These two changes have opposing effects on the 
multiplier. The final effect will be shown in three steps, following the logic of Erdős13. 
In step 1 we assume that the personal income tax revenue decreases by 100 units, 
leading to 100 extra income for the consumers. Some part of this additional income is 
saved, and the rest is consumed. The propensity to consume (c) and the propensity to save 
(s) show how the additional income is split between the two. The part that is consumed 
lands in the pocket of other economic agents, who will then split that additional income 
between saving and consumption, and so on. This is the basic multiplier effect which – 
according to Erdős – takes around 2 years to go through the economy. But there are two 
more factors that need to be taken into consideration. On the one hand, when people gain 
additional income from the multiplying consumption, they have to pay income tax after it. 
So their additional consumption in not only determined by the propensity to consume, but 
also by the tax rate (t, which in a flat tax system is ideally single rate and the same for all 
kinds of income). On the other hand some of the consumption will represent the purchase 
of foreign made goods. Because imported items were made abroad, the money spent on 
them moves outside the country, and therefore is no longer part of the multiplying income. 
The import part is shown by the propensity to import (m).The overall multiplier is very 
simple: 
                                                    
So if the propensity to consume is 90%, the tax rate is 20%, and the propensity to 
import is 50%, the multiplier is 1.5625, meaning that a 100-unit decrease in the personal 
income tax burden will generate 156.25 units of additional GDP. Christina and David 
Romer14 calculated a tax multiplier for the USA. They found that its value is around 1 
after the first year, and is a bit above 1 after two years, after which the effect levels off. 
The multiplier calculated by the Romers is considerably lower than the one given by our 
simple formula. The difference is even more striking if we consider that the propensity to 
import is considerably lower in the USA than the 50% that was used in the calculation 
above (if m=20%, for example, the multiplier is above 2.3). The difference can be 
explained by a number of reasons: the tax cut may favour the rich, whose propensity to 
save is higher; prices may rise if the supply cannot adjust to the increased demand; 
interest rates may also rise, prompting people to save more. 
Step 2 addresses the issue of the unequal distribution of the tax relief. Flat rate taxes 
leave more money in the pockets of the rich than in those of the middle class, while, if 
they are truly flat, with no exemption for the very poor, flat taxes increase the tax burden 
of the poor. As the rich tend to save a lot more (because they are in a position to be able to 
afford it), the introduction of the flat tax system leads to high propensity to save ratios, 
much higher than the 10% used in the initial calculation (again, if c=60% instead of 90%, 
the value of the multiplier drops to 1.3). 
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If the personal income tax is cut, and there is a decrease in the tax revenues, the budget 
deficit will likely increase. As a step 3, we have to consider the fact that in most countries 
the budget is not balanced in the first place, so it may well be that counter measures are 
required to fix the deficit problem. The government may raise other taxes, or cut 
spending. Both of these moves have a negative multiplier, which decreases the GDP, so it 
counters the positive changes generated by the flat tax reform. 
Overall, the demand side analysis does not offer too much support for the flat tax. 
Even if the tax rates are cut, which should increase the GDP over the midterm, there are a 
lot of negative effects that counter the positive one. First of all, the income distribution 
will likely become more unequal, something that most demand side economist do not like, 
not least, because it increases the propensity to save, and decreases the multiplier. It also 
goes against the general Western, or Western European consensus of having tax codes that 
are focused heavily on income redistribution. And the flat tax increases the budget deficit 
in the demand side analysis, which leads to further problems, and it can completely negate 
the positive effect on growth. 
The budget deficit effect is one of the key points where the demand and supply side 
arguments collide. For a demand side economist it is obvious that when the tax rate 
decreases, the tax revenue will decrease as well, and vice versa. This, however, is not so 
obvious if we take a look at the problem from the supply side, notably from the 
perspective of the taxpayer. As Wanniski15, one of the first propagators of the supply side 
argument, pointed out, a person is willing to sacrifice some of his free time because he 
needs to earn an income used to satisfy his needs. The more free time he sacrifices, and 
the more productive he is in his job, the higher income he will earn. Taxes affect this 
substitution process between leisure and work. The higher the tax rate, the less income can 
one realise when he sacrifices some free time. Progressive taxes therefore hurt at the most 
delicate point of the economy, where the highest value is created: at the level of 
entrepreneurs and managers. They are the ones who coordinate the work of thousands of 
employees, and make the company work. Because they earn a high salary, usually they 
are in the highest tax bracket (currently around 40-50% in most countries with a 
progressive income tax). So when a manager or an entrepreneur thinks about sacrificing 
more leisure, he also has to face the fact that an additional hour worked, that might yield 
him 1000 extra euros, only gives him 300 or 400 extra, because the rest is paid as taxes or 
social security contribution. 
The effect that income taxes have on the individual wanting to make the perfect split 
between leisure and work, is summarised by the income and the substitution effects. 
Income effect tells us that when the tax rate is decreased, the same amount of work yields 
higher income for the individual, prompting him to trade more work hours off for some 
free time, i.e. decrease his activity because he already has everything he needs, leading to 
a decrease in output. The substitution effect tells the opposite story. When there is a tax 
rate cut, the wage for the extra hour worked goes up from the previous 400 euros to, say, 
500. The opportunity cost of free time is increased by 100 euros per hour. Because the 
opportunity cost of leisure is higher, the individual will more likely trade some of his 
leisure hours off for some work. The substitution effect thus leads to higher output. If we 
assume that the income effect and the substitution effect are similar in their impact, there 
is no point in wasting more time for the supply side analysis. Supply side economists, 
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however, tell us that the substitution effect is always stronger than the income effect, i.e. 
individual effort and aggregate output increases when taxes are cut, and decreases when 
taxes are raised. 
Fig 2. Annual percentage change of GDP in Estonia, Russia and Slovakia, year of flat tax 
introduced=0 (Source: own compilation based on IMF data: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx) 
 
In reality there is a three-way trade-off when taxes are considered. The trade-off 
between leisure and work is there anyway, even if there are no taxes. When taxes are 
levied, however, one has the option to trade formal or official work (which can be taxed) 
off for informal or unofficial work (one that is illegal, so it is not taxed). The raising of 
taxes therefore has a double negative effect on output: because of the substitution effect 
individuals trade work off for leisure, decreasing their individual efforts; and they also 
trade legal work off for illegal one, decreasing the official output measured by the GDP, 
and also decreasing the tax base. The tax base is a key notion in the supply side argument, 
because by considering the tax base we can separate tax rates from tax revenues. If the tax 
rates are raised, the tax base shrinks (partly because people opt for more leisure, partly 
because they go illegal), and so tax revenues can also decrease, despite higher rates. On 
the other hand, if tax rats are cut, the tax base expands, so higher revenues may be 
collected despite lower tax rates. 
The above idea is best described by the classic Laffer curve, named after Arthur 
Laffer, and introduced by Wanniski in his famous book, The Way the World Works16. 
Arguments based on the Laffer curve are very common across Eastern and Central 
Europe, and they were undoubtedly behind the flat tax reforms as well. It worth 
mentioning that in the 1970s, when Wanniski and Laffer came up with the idea, it was not 
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uncommon that the highest marginal tax rate was above 80%. In such conditions it is 
indeed quite a realistic assumption that a decrease in the highest tax rates actually expands 
the tax base so much that tax revenues increase. A lot has changed since then, and the top 
marginal rates have dropped substantially. The highest top rate on personal income in 
Europe is in Sweden at 57%. 
The top rate at which tax revenues can be maximised can be very different, depending 
on the characteristics of the countries. It depends on the rate at which the society tolerates, 
or even accepts tax evasion and tax fraud; it also depends on the quality of public goods 
the government is able to provide with the taxes it collects. As a result the high tax rates in 
some of the Eastern and Central European countries are not a very good indication of the 
true tax burden17. Indeed, the Russian tax reform showed that the Laffer curve works at 
much lower tax rates than one would expect. In 2000 Russia had marginal tax rates of 
12%, 20% and 30%, which was then changed to a single 13% rate in 2001. As a result 
income tax revenues rose by 25.2% in 2001, by 24.6% in 2002, by 15.2% in 2003 and a 
further 16% in 2004. It meant that personal income tax revenues more than doubled in real 
terms in four years18. The huge increase was partly a result of general economic 
prosperity, increasing employment figures, individuals working more hours etc., but it 
was also a result of illegal activities being shifted to the legal side. Slonimczyk showed 
that the tax reform lead to a decrease in the fraction of informal employees. He estimates 
the drop in informal illegal activities to 2.5-4%, and shows that the reform made it 14% 
less likely that someone entering the job market would engage in informal irregular 
activities19.  
Evidence from other countries does not offer such strong support for the Laffer curve 
argument. Brook and Leibfritz argued that the Slovakian tax reform was revenue neutral20, 
which helps in improving the efficiency of the economy (taxation does not affect the 
resource allocation decisions). Other effects, however, could not be detected. If we take a 
look at Fig. 2., we can see that there is no clear connection between GDP growth and the 
flat tax. Russia has experienced high economic growth after the flat tax was introduced, 
but the same was true to the years before the 2001 reform. Slovakian growth picked up 
after the 2004 flat rate reform, but then it slumped in 2009, undoubtedly affected by the 
global crisis. Estonia’s graph tells the same story: there is an initial spike, which is then 
followed by a big drop in 1999. Although after 1999 growth picked up again, and it 
almost reached a yearly average of 8% for the next 8 years. 
Supply side economists have much stronger arguments for the flat rate tax, than 
demand side ones. But the evidence only partially backs those arguments, to say the least. 
It seems to work with Russia, but then the Russian economic model is regarded by few as 
a good example for a market economy. There are even signs that the Eastern and Central 
17
 S. Bozsik, Main Changes in European Tax Policies between 2007 and 2011, Theory 
Methodology Practice, 9/2, 2013, pp. 29-34. 
18
 P. Basham, D. Mitchell, 2008, pp. 116-117 
19
 F. Slonimczyk, The effect of taxation on informal employment: evidence from the Russian flat tax 
reform, in: H. Lehmann, K. Tatsiramos (eds.) Informal Employment in Emerging and Transition 
Economies (Research in Labor Economics, Volume 34), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2012, 
pp.55-99. 
20
 A-M. Brook, W. Leibfritz, Slovakia’s Introduction of the Flat Tax as Part of Wider Economic 
Reforms, OECD Working Papers nr. 448, 2005.
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European flat tax phenomenon will not last for very long. Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic have already abolished the single rate personal income tax. So did Albania, and 
the political elites of other countries are also debating the issue. The paper now tries to 
identify some patterns based on Hungary’s experience. 
3. THE FLAT TAX REFORM IN HUNGARY 
The Hungarian flat tax reform was announced in 2010, and took effect in 2011. 
Although the personal income tax has a flat nominal rate, the effective rate can be very 
different for taxpayers with different income levels and/or with different number of 
children (see Table 2.). The main change was the switch from the system based on 
marginal rates of 17% and 32% to a 16% flat rate. Apart from the switch from a 
progressive to a linear tax code, the change also incorporated a significant nominal 
decrease in the tax rate.  
Table 2. Personal income tax changes in Hungary, 2010-2014 (Source: own compilation). 
Tax category 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nominal 
rate(s) 
17% and 32% 16% 16% 16% 16% 
Tax base Aggregate 
income * 1.27 
Aggregate 
income * 
1.27 
Aggregate 
income * 
1.27 
(above 2.4 
mil) 
Aggregate income 
Low income 
tax credit 
max. 17% max. 16% - 
Family tax 
credit 
4,000 
HUF/child/ 
month* 
62,500 or 206,250 HUF/child/month 
Effective 
rate(s) 
0%-21.59% 
and 40.64% 
0%-20.32% 0%, 16% 
and 
20.32% 
0%-16% 0%-
16% 
*The 2010 family allowance is not comparable with the credits of the successive years. A 
comparable amount would be around 20,000-25,000 HUF/child/month. 
The overall tax burden was lowered even before the flat rate took effect, as the cut-off 
point of the lower bracket was raised from HUF 1.9 million to HUF 5 million in that year 
(which was around twice as high as the average annual gross salary). As the zero marginal 
rate was abolished earlier, these changes meant that the tax burden of the poor has risen 
considerably. To compensate for their losses, the tax credit system was put in place, which 
allowed the taxpayers with the lowest income to get a compensation that more or less 
equalled the tax they had to pay because of the cancellation of the zero rate bracket. This 
tax credit system was cancelled in 2012. So the effects of the cancellation of the zero 
marginal rate bracket were fully experienced in 2012. But, as Table 2. shows, many 
taxpayers still had an effective tax rate of zero, because of the very generous family tax 
credit. Starting from 2011, one of the parents from a family can reduce his/her tax base by 
HUF 62,500/month for each child (if they raise one or two children), or HUF 
206,250/month for each child (if they raise three or more children). The family tax credit 
36 Z. Bartha 
 
is so large, that many families actually don’t have to pay personal income taxes; in fact, 
there are many families where the monthly income is so low that they cannot make use of 
the full credit. For this reason starting from 2014 families can reduce their social security 
contributions as well, if their tax base is not large enough. Overall it is clear that the 
redistribution effect of the new personal income tax code favours the high income 
families, and the ones that raise children. 
3.1. Tax revenues and tax burden 
Tax revenues soared in Russia after the tax rate reduction. Hungary’s example tells an 
opposite story. Starting from 2008, there has been a continuous direct and/or indirect cut 
in the tax rates. Between 2008-10 tax rates were cut a bit (the lower rate went to 17% 
from 18%, the higher one to 32% from 36%), and the upper bound of the lower bracket 
was raised. From 2011 the flat rate of 16% took effect. The tax reduction is shown by the 
calculated effective rate (total tax paid divided by total tax base) as well: in 2008 it was 
19.35%, which was reduced to 14.03% by 2011 (see Table 3.). In 2012 the effective rate 
rose again, to 15.07%, as a result of the abolishment of the low income tax credit. 
Table 3. Key economic and tax related indicators of Hungary (Source: own compilation 
based on data by Hungarian Central Statistics Office and National Tax and 
Customs Administration) 
Key indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP growth (%) 0.893 -6.767 1.054 1.571 -1.665 
Inflation (%) 6.066 4.209 4.881 3.957 5.706 
Number of tax 
reporters 4 646 778 4 492 073 4 567 985 4 495 237 4 463 820 
Total tax base 
(million HUF) 9 250 248 8 875 284 8 872 478 8 586 188 9 002 918 
Family tax credit 
(deducted from the 
tax base, million 
HUF) - - - 1 126 193 1 151 071 
Total tax payable 
without deductions 
(million HUF) 2 286 050 2 121 836 2 128 077 1 548 342 1 365 952 
Deductions (million 
HUF) 502 257 485 965 645 727 370 492 10 123 
Total tax paid (million 
HUF) 1 790 369 1 643 349 1 486 524 1 204 472 1 356 862 
Effective tax rate  19.35% 18.52% 16.75% 14.03% 15.07% 
Ratio of reporters 
below the annual 
income of HUF 2 
million (%) 38.17 38.71 37.67 35.94 33.4 
Ratio of reporters 
above the annual 
income of HUF 2 
million (%) 61.83 61.29 62.33 64.06 66.6 
As nominal and effective tax rates declined, so did the tax revenues. While in 2008 
the annual personal income tax revenue was as high as HUF 1,790 billion, by 2012 it 
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dropped to 1,350 billion. With inflation taken into consideration (20% during the 2009-
2012 period), personal income tax revenues dropped by almost 40% in real terms. The 
picture is not so grim if we only consider the last two years, 2011 and 2012, when the flat 
tax was in effect: a 280 billion drop in the first year, then a 150 billion increase in the 
second year. On the one hand, this can be interpreted as the gradual appearance of the 
positive effects; but one cannot forget about the fact that the flat rate tax kicked in in two 
phases in Hungary: the low income tax credit (basically a zero rate for the poor) was still 
available in 2011, and then cancelled in 2012. 2013 data (which will only be available in 
October, 2014) might help in establishing a clearer trend, but in terms of the tax base 2012 
and 2013 is not comparable (in 2012 the higher income taxpayers were taxed after a so 
called supergross base that included the 27% social security contribution paid by the 
employers – see Table 2.).  
The comparison is made even more difficult by the effects of the global economic 
environment. Hungary started to lower the income tax rates right when the global crisis 
stroke. Unemployment rose, and the tax base naturally shrank as a result. One cannot 
realistically expect higher revenues in such conditions. 
3.2. Administrative considerations 
Flat rate taxes lower the transaction cost of taxpayers because they make it easier to 
file the tax. Ideally all types and all levels of income are taxed at the same rate, which 
makes it easier to pool together income coming from different sources, and basically ends 
the incentive to try and conceal certain types of income (the ones that are taxed at a higher 
rate). Hungary shows some improvement in this area. Although the corporate income tax 
is different from the personal income one (it is still progressive, with rates of 10% and 
19%), most of the personal incomes have the 16% rate: wages, service fees, private 
entrepreneur income, interest rates, dividends, capital gains, land rent. 
Table 3. also shows that most of the tax deductions were eliminated by 2012. 
Deductions, once put in place, tend to become more and more complicated, and more and 
more widespread. The only major tax credit available in Hungary is the credit after 
children. The total tax base is reduced by around 12-13% because of it. It is questionable, 
whether the lack of major deductions will stay for a longer period, though. In 2013 the 
regulators made it possible to get tax deductions after long term insurance contracts. 
Further deductions were granted in 2014: after housing finance assistances, pension fund 
payments, and purchases of season tickets to sporting events. 
3.3. Supply side and the signal hypothesis 
As indicated above, and as it is shown by Table 3., although the effective rate has went 
down significantly in the period of 2008-2012, economic growth did not pick up at all. In 
fact, there was a decline in economic performance in 2009 (in the year in which virtually 
all European economies contracted), and in 2012. Growth barely went above 1% in the 
rest of the years. Hungary’s GDP growth figures does not seem to back the idea that a tax 
cut, and especially the introduction of a flat rate, increases the incentives of the 
individuals to work more, and therefore leads to higher output overall. There are several 
explanations to the phenomenon. 
First of all, in the 2008-2012 period growth cooled down globally, and in Europe 
especially. As the Hungarian economy is very open, the global contraction strongly 
affected the domestic economy. Second, Hungary had had major budget balance problems 
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throughout the 2000s, which lead to a crisis of the government finances in the autumn of 
2008 (solved with the help of the IMF and the EU). Starting from 2008 the budget balance 
has been the main priority of the Hungarian governments, contractionary fiscal policy 
measures were taken every year. These contractionary steps could easily overshadow the 
positive effects of the flat rate personal income tax. Despite the fact that the effective 
personal income tax rate went from 19% to 15% between 2008 and 2012, the overall tax 
burden has risen in the period. The general government revenue expressed in term of the 
GDP was 45.5% in 2008, 46.9% in 2012 and 47.9% in 2013 (IMF World Economic 
Outlook).  
Table 4. Hungary’s local currency government bond rating (Source: own compilation using 
data by Moody’s) 
2000 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 
A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa3 Ba1 Ba1 
The Laffer curve argument tells us that government revenues can increase when tax 
rates are cut. But this is not what happened in Hungary. The personal income tax rate was 
cut, but personal income tax revenues decreased as well. The higher revenues came from 
the new taxes that the government levied after 2010. More than 25 new taxes were 
introduced, although some of them did not produce a high amount of revenue. As some of 
the older taxes were abolished, overall the number of taxes levied by the central 
government was increased from the 34 in 2010 to 41 in 2014. Such frequent changes in 
taxation hardly help in reducing the transaction costs of the process. The most important 
new taxes were levied on typically foreign owned, large corporation: banks, insurance 
companies, telecommunication firms, retail stores, public utilities, media enterprises21. 
The tax burden on banks was increased the most: the special bank tax levied an annual 
HUF 187 billion on financial corporations between 2010 and 2014, while there was a 
financial transaction fee introduced as well in 2013, yielding an annual HUF 300 billion 
for the budget (300 billion is a bit more than 1% of the annual GDP).  
Tensions between the government and the banks lead to a massive drop in lending, 
which has probably contributed to the contraction of the economy. But the special taxes 
also battered the government’s image in the eyes of foreign investors. Despite the fact that 
Hungary managed to keep the budget deficit under control, and despite the flat tax 
announced as early as 2010 (events that should have increased the trust of foreign 
investors), the expert’s expectations on the country’s perspectives got worse and worse. 
Table 4. shows Hungary’s credit rating prepared by Moody’s. When the 2008 crisis hit, 
the rating was at A2, which was lowered to A3 after the government finances crisis of 
October 2008. The rating has been in the Ba category (judged to be speculative) since 
2011, the worst since the early 1990s. 
By taking a closer look at Table 3., we can still find some evidence supporting the 
trade-off hypothesis of the supply side argument. As mentioned before, in case of a tax 
rate cut people may want to work more (substitution effect), and individuals engaged in 
illegal activities may rethink their strategy, and switch to the formal sector. Let’s start 
with the second type of substitution. A private entrepreneur, who previously concealed the 
majority of his income because of the high tax rates, may feel that there is no longer need 
21
 Papp Zs., Adóemelés Magyarországon - így fizet többet a lakosság. Napi Gzadaság, 28.01.2014. 
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for such tricks if the tax rate is halved to 16%, as it happened in 2011. If a considerable 
number of high income taxpayers think the same way, there should be a noticeable 
increase in the number of individuals reporting higher incomes. The last two rows of 
Table 3. might support this idea. The Hungarian tax office provides data about the 
distribution of taxpayers sorted by their tax base in the following structure: 1) tax base 
between 0 and 500 thousand forints; 2) 500-1 million; 3) 1-1.5 million; 4) 1.5-2 million; 
5) 2-4 million; 6) above 4 million. The 2 million mark seems relevant in our analysis,
because until 2010 the cut-off point for the higher tax bracket was below it. In 2010 the 
upper bound was raised to 5 million, and the number of reporters above an annual income 
of HUF 2 million increased to 62.3% from 61.3%. In 2011, when the flat rate took effect, 
the ratio went up to 64%, and in 2012 it reached 66.6%. The change is rather dynamic, 
even though we have to consider the effect of inflation as well, that tends to drive up 
nominal wages. 
While the flat rate income tax may create an incentive for richer individuals to report 
their full income to the tax office, the current social security contribution system works 
against that. Hungary has the second highest social security contribution rate (28.5% paid 
by the employer, 18.5% paid by the employees) among the countries that have tried the 
flat tax (see table 5.). So the real burden for the high income taxpayers is not the 16% 
income tax, but the 18.5% individual contribution, and 28.5% paid by the employer. A 
further problem is that the value of the social security contribution is not in line with the 
value of services people get in exchange. Each individual is entitled to the same health 
care services, no matter how much he pays. So a cheesy private entrepreneur who only 
pays a monthly minimum of 5-6 thousand gets the same package as an honest one, paying 
several million. With pensions it is bit different, but again, pensions do not rise linearly as 
the social security contribution increases, and they are capped as well. Many countries 
apply a cap on social security payments for this reason, but the cap was abolished in 
Hungary, when the flat rate tax was announced.  
The average gross monthly wage in Hungary is around HUF 230 thousand at the 
moment. If the employee does not have any children, and the firm is not entitled for some 
social security contribution relief (introduced in the 2010s to increase the employment rate 
among social cohorts with the highest job finding difficulties) the 230 thousand gross 
wage pays a 150 thousand net income, and costs 295 thousand to the firm. So an 
employee needs to create a value around the double of his net income because of the tax 
and social security contribution wedge. The wedge increased further on employers in 
2012, when the low income tax credit was abolished. The government accepted a 
regulation that made it compulsory for employers to compensate for the net income losses 
caused by the cancellation of the low income tax credit22. Such interventions make the 
government policies look extremely negative from a supply side perspective. 
There is no evidence for the leisure-work substitution effect. The OECD collects 
statistics on the average annual working time (in hours per worker). Here are the data for 
Hungary: 2005: 1 987; 2006: 1 983; 2007: 1 978; 2008: 1 982; 2009: 1 965; 2010: 1 959; 
2011: 1 976; 2012: 1 888 (OECD: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/average-
annual-working-time_20752342-table8). The numbers do not indicate an increasing trend. 
22
 Government Regulation nr. 299/2011 (December 22) on the expected rate of wage increase, 2011. 
http://jogszabalykereso.mhk.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=143213.580592 
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Table 5. Social security contribution rates in 2014 in the Eastern and Central European 
countries that has experimented with the flat tax (Source: own compilation based 
on EY data: http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax) 
Country Social contribution Remark 
Albania 27.9 capped 
Belarus 35 capped 
Bulgaria 30.5 capped 
Czech Republic 45 
Estonia 33 
Hungary 47 
Latvia 35.09 
Lithuania 34 
Macedonia 27 
Montenegro 34.47 capped 
Romania 44.25 capped 
Russia 30 10% above cap 
Slovakia 48.6 
4. CONCLUSION
The flat rate tax has six major advantages according to the literature: 1) decreases the 
transaction cost of taxation; 2) signals a market friendly attitude toward investors; 3) 
contributes to economic growth through the multiplier-accelerator effect (although real 
multipliers can be a lot lower than the ones suggested by theoretical models); 4) acts as an 
incentive to trade leisure and illegal activities off for work; 5) can therefore increase 
overall output; 6) can increase tax revenues despite the lower tax rates. It has its 
disadvantages as well: 1) may lead to an increased budget deficit; 2) favours the rich, by 
reducing their tax burdens, while the burden on the poor can easily increase. 
The Hungarian experience shows the following. The tax introduced is not a true flat 
rate tax, because 1) it only involves personal income, and there are different rates for 
corporate income; 2) it is not without exemptions and deductions, as there is a substantial 
family tax credit available. Still, by 2012 the number of deductions went down 
considerably, moving the flat tax closer to its textbook version. From 2013 the number of 
deductions started going up again. There are also signs that higher income taxpayers 
started to report higher parts of their income officially, as the ratio of those tax reporters 
who earned an annual income of HUF 2 million or higher has gone from 62.5% to 66.6% 
in the period of 2010-12.  
It was also found that the tax rate cuts did not lead to an increase in personal income 
tax revenues. Quite the contrary, whenever the effective rate dropped, so did the tax 
revenue. The government had to implement a lot of special taxes to compensate for the 
lost revenue, but that move has really eroded its reputation. The flat rate tax could not 
become a signal of market friendly attitude as a result. Economic growth did not pick up 
either, although it worth mentioning that the tax reform was introduced in a period when 
economic output was stagnating in most of the developed countries. The flat tax indeed 
favoured higher income taxpayers, especially after the low income tax credit was 
cancelled in 2012. Overall the Hungarian experience offers few arguments in favour of the 
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tax, although the flat tax is obviously backed by those with higher income, and/or with 
children. 
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ZRYCZAŁTOWANY PODATEK DOCHODOWY NA WĘGRZECH I JEGO 
SKUTKI 
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wad i zalet zryczałtowanego podatku dochodowego 
oraz skutki jego wprowadzenia na Węgrzech. Źródłem danych była  Węgierska Krajowa 
Administracja Skarbowa oraz Administracja Celna. Zaobserwowano, że podatek 
dochodowy rzeczywiście sprzyjał bogatszym podatnikom, a ze względu na ulgi podatkowe 
w dużym stopniu sprzyjał również rodzinom z dziećmi. Dochody z podatków spadły w 
momencie gdy stawki podatkowe zostały zredukowane, a tempo wzrostu PKB było bliskie 
stagnacji. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych badań stwierdzono, że oba te wydarzenia były 
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wbrew zwolennikom podatków zryczałtowanych i ich oczekiwaniom, choć należy 
wspomnieć, że zmiany te zostały dokonane w momencie europejskiego i światowego 
załamania, co mogłyby zniekształcić skutki nowego kodeksu podatkowego. Chociaż w 
wielu krajach podatek ryczałtowy był pozytywnym sygnałem dla inwestorów i podnosił 
zagraniczne  inwestycje, rząd węgierski wprowadził dodatkowe podatki dla niektórych 
międzynarodowych firm w celu zrównoważenia budżetu (i zrekompensowania utraconych 
wpływów podatkowych od dochodów osobistych), co oznaczało, że nastąpił spadek 
nastrojów wśród inwestorów. Istnieją pewne wskazania, że niektóre nielegalne działania 
stały się legalnymi: stosunek podatników, którzy osiągnęli roczny dochód w wysokości 2 
mln HUF lub wyższej wzrósł z 62,5% do 66,6% w latach 2010-12. 
Słowa kluczowe: zryczałtowany podatek dochodowy, Węgry, statystyki podatkowe, 
dystrybucja dochodu 
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